Making Strategy Work Epub Bud

Making Strategy Work Epub Bud

Making Strategy Work Epub Bud - https://urlgoal.com/2t68LZ

In the War of Resistance Against Japan, regular warfare is primary andguerrilla warfare supplementary. This point has already been correctly settled.Thus, it seems there are only tactical problems in guerrilla warfare. Whythen raise the question of strategy?If China were a small country in which the role of guerrilla warfare wasonly to render direct support over short distances to the campaigns of theregular army, there would, of course, be only tactical problems but no strategicones. On the other hand, if China were a country as strong as the SovietUnion and the invading enemy could either be quickly expelled, or, even thoughhis expulsion were to take some time, he could not occupy extensive areas,then again guerrilla warfare would simply play a supporting role in campaigns,and would naturally involve only tactical but not strategic problems.The question of strategy in guerrilla war does arise, however, in the caseof China, which is neither small nor like the Soviet Union, but which isboth a large and a weak country. This large and weak country is being attackedby a small and strong country, but the large and weak country is in an eraof progress; this is the source of the whole problem. It is in thesecircumstances that vast areas have come under enemy occupation and that thewar has become a protracted one. The enemy is occupying vast areas of thislarge country of ours, but Japan is a small country, she does not have sufficientsoldiers and has to leave many gaps in the occupied areas, so that ouranti-Japanese guerrilla warfare consists primarily not in interior-lineoperations in support of the campaigns of the regular troops but in independentoperations on exterior lines; furthermore, China is progressive, that isto say, she has a staunch army and broad masses of people, both led by theCommunist Party, so that, far from being small-scale, our anti-Japanese guerrillawarfare is in fact large-scale warfare. Hence the emergence of a whole seriesof problems, such as the strategic defensive, the strategic offensive, etc.The protracted nature of the war and its attendant ruthlessness have madeit imperative for guerrilla warfare to undertake many unusual tasks; hencesuch problems as those of the base areas, the development of guerrilla warfareinto mobile warfare, and so on. For all these reasons, China's guerrillawarfare against Japan has broken out of the bounds of tactics to knock atthe gates of strategy, and it demands examination from the viewpoint of strategy.The point that merits our particular attention is that such extensive aswell as protracted guerrilla warfare is quite new in the entire history ofwar. This is bound up with the fact that we are now in the Nineteen Thirtiesand Nineteen Forties and that we now have the Communist Party and the RedArmy. Herein lies the heart of the matter. Our enemy is probably still cherishingfond dreams of emulating the Mongol conquest of the Sung Dynasty, the Manchuconquest of the Ming Dynasty, the British occupation of North America andIndia, the Latin occupation of Central and South America, etc. But such dreamshave no practical value in present-day China because there are certain factorspresent in the China of today which were absent in those historical instances,and one of them is guerrilla warfare, which is quite a new phenomenon. Ifour enemy overlooks this fact, he will certainly come to grief.These are the reasons why our anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare, though occupyingonly a supplementary place in the War of Resistance as a whole, must neverthelessbe examined from the viewpoint of strategy.Why not, then, apply to guerrilla warfare the general strategic principlesof the War of Resistance?The question of strategy in our anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare is indeedclosely linked with the question of strategy in the War of Resistance asa whole, because they have much in common. On the other hand, guerrilla warfareis different from regular warfare and has its own peculiarities, and consequentlymany peculiar elements are involved in the question of strategy in guerrillawarfare. Without modification it is impossible to apply the strategic principlesof the War of Resistance in general to guerrilla warfare with its ownpeculiarities. CHAPTER II THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF WAR IS TO PRESERVE ONESELF AND DESTROY THE ENEMY Before discussing the question of strategy in guerrilla warfare in concreteterms, a few words are needed on the fundamental problem of war.All the guiding principles of military operations grow out of the one basicprinciple: to strive to the utmost to preserve one's own strength and destroythat of the enemy. In a revolutionary war, this principle is directly linkedwith basic political principles. For instance, the basic political principleof China's War of Resistance Against Japan, i.e., its politicalaim, is to drive out Japanese imperialism and build an independent, freeand happy new China. In terms of military action this principle means theuse of armed force to defend our motherland and to drive out the Japaneseinvaders. To attain this end, the operations of the armed units take theform of doing their utmost to preserve their own strength on the one handand destroy the enemies on the other. How then do we justify the encouragementof heroic sacrifice in war? Every war exacts a price, sometimes an extremelyhigh one. Is this not in contradiction with "preserving oneself"? In fact,these is no contradiction at all; to put it more exactly; sacrifice andself-preservation are both opposite and complementary to each other. Forsuch sacrifice is essential not only for destroying the enemy but also forpreserving oneself--partial and temporary "non-preservation" (sacrifice,or paying the price) is necessary for the sake of general and permanentpreservation. From this basic principle stems the series of principles guidingmilitary operations, all of which--from the principles of shooting (takingcover to preserve oneself, and making full use of fire-power to destroy theenemy) to the principles of strategy--are permeated with the spirit of thisbasic principle. All technical, tactical and strategic principles representapplications of this basic principle. The principle of preserving oneselfand destroying the enemy is the basis of all military principles. CHAPTER III SIX SPECIFIC PROBLEMS OF STRATEGY IN GUERRILLA WAR AGAINST JAPANNow let us see what policies or principles have to be adopted in guerrillaoperations against Japan before we can attain the object of preserving ourselvesand destroying the enemy. Since the guerrilla units in the War of Resistance(and in all other revolutionary wars) generally grow out of nothing and expandfrom a small to a large force, they must preserve themselves and, moreover,they must expand. Hence the question is, what policies or principles haveto be adopted before we can attain the object of preserving and expandingourselves and destroying the enemy?Generally speaking, the main principles are as follows: (1) the use ofinitiative, flexibility and planning in conducting offensives within thedefensive, battles of quick decision within protracted war, and exterior-lineoperations within interior-line operations; (2) co-ordination with regularwarfare; (3) establishment of base areas; (4) the strategic defensive andthe strategic offensive; (5) the development of guerrilla warfare into mobilewarfare; and (6) correct relationship of command. These six items constitutethe whole of the strategic programme for guerrilla war against Japan andare the means necessary for the preservation and expansion of our forces,for the destruction and expulsion of the enemy, for co-ordination with regularwarfare and the winning of final victory. CHAPTER IV INITIATIVE, FLEXIBILITY AND PLANNING IN CONDUCTING OFFENSIVES WITHIN THE DEFENSIVE, BATTLES OF QUICK DECISION WITHIN PROTRACTED WAR, AND EXTERIOR-LINE OPERATIONS WITHIN INTERIOR-LINE OPERATIONSHere the subject may be dealt with under four headings: (1) the relationshipbetween the defensive and the offensive, between protractedness and quickdecision, and between the interior and exterior lines; (2) the initiativein all operations; (3) flexible employment of forces; and (4) planning inall operations.To start with the first.If we take the War of Resistance as a whole, the fact that Japan is a strongcountry and is attacking while China is a weak country and is defending herselfmakes our war strategically a defensive and protracted war. As far as theoperational lines are concerned, the Japanese are operating on exterior andwe on interior lines. This is one aspect of the situation. But there is anotheraspect which is just the reverse. The enemy forces, though strong (in arms,in certain qualities of their men, and certain other factors), are numericallysmall, whereas our forces, though weak (likewise, in arms, in certain qualitiesof our men, and certain other factors), are numerically very large. Addedto the fact that the enemy is an alien nation invading our country whilewe are resisting his invasion on our own soil, this determines the followingstrategy. It is possible and necessary to use tactical offensives withinthe strategic defensive, to fight campaigns and battles of quick decisionwithin a strategically protracted war and to fight campaigns and battleson exterior lines within strategically interior lines. Such is the strategyto be adopted in the War of Resistance as a whole. It holds true both forregular and for guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla warfare is different only indegree and form. Offensives in guerrilla warfare generally take the formof surprise attacks. Although surprise attacks can and should be employedin regular warfare too, the degree of surprise is less. In guerrilla warfare,the need to bring operations to a quick decision is very great, and ourexterior-line ring of encirclement of the enemy in campaigns and battlesis very small. All these distinguish it from regular warfare.Thus it can be seen that in their operations guerrilla units have to concentratethe maximum forces, act secretly and swiftly, attack the enemy by surpriseand bring battles to a quick decision, and that they must strictly avoidpassive defence, procrastination and the dispersal of forces before engagements.Of course, guerrilla warfare includes not only the strategic but also thetactical defensive. The latter embraces, among other things, containing andoutpost actions during battles; the disposition of forces for resistanceat narrow passes, strategic points, rivers or villages in order to depleteand exhaust the enemy; and action to cover withdrawal. But the basic principleof guerrilla warfare must be the offensive, and guerrilla warfare is moreoffensive in its character than regular warfare. The offensive, moreover,must take the form of surprise attacks, and to expose ourselves by ostentatiouslyparading our forces is even less permissible in guerrilla warfare than inregular warfare. From the fact that the enemy is strong and we are weak itnecessarily follows that, in guerrilla operations in general even more thanin regular warfare, battles must be decided quickly, though on some occasionsguerrilla fighting may be kept up for several days, as in an assault on asmall and isolated enemy force cut off from help. Because of its dispersedcharacter, guerrilla warfare can spread everywhere, and in many of its tasks,as in harassing, containing and disrupting the enemy and in mass work, itsprinciple is dispersal of forces; but a guerrilla unit, or a guerrilla formation,must concentrate its main forces when it is engaged in destroying the enemy,and especially when it is striving to smash an enemy attack. "Concentratea big force to strike at a small section of the enemy force" remains a principleof field operations in guerrilla warfare.Thus it can also be seen that, if we take the War of Resistance as a whole,we can attain the aim of our strategic defensive and finally defeat Japaneseimperialism only through the cumulative effect of many offensive campaignsand battles in both regular and guerrilla warfare, namely, through the cumulativeeffect of many victories in offensive actions. Only through the cumulativeeffect of many campaigns and battles of quick decision, namely, the cumulativeeffect of many victories achieved through quick decision in offensive campaignsand battles, can we attain our goal of strategic protractedness, which meansgaining time to increase our capacity to resist while hastening or awaitingchanges in the international situation and the internal collapse of the enemy,in order to be able to launch a strategic counter-offensive and drive theJapanese invaders out of China. We must concentrate superior forces and fightexterior-line operations in every campaign or battle, whether in the stageof strategic defensive or in that of strategic counter-offensive, in orderto encircle and destroy the enemy forces, encircling part if not all of them,destroying part if not all of the forces we have encircled, and inflictingheavy casualties on the encircled forces if we cannot capture them in largenumbers. Only through the cumulative effect of many such battles of annihilationcan we change the relative position as between the enemy and ourselves,thoroughly smash his strategic encirclement--that is, his scheme of exterior-lineoperations--and finally, in co-ordination, with international forces andthe revolutionary struggles of the Japanese people, surround the Japaneseimperialists and deal them the coup de grace. These results areto be achieved mainly through regular warfare, with guerrilla warfare makinga secondary contribution. What is common to both, however, is the accumulationof many minor victories to make a major victory. Herein lies the great strategicrole of guerrilla warfare in the War of Resistance.Now let us discuss initiative, flexibility and planning in guerrilla warfare.What is initiative in guerrilla warfare?In any war, the opponents contend for the initiative, whether on a battlefield,in a battle area, in a war zone or in the whole war, for the initiative meansfreedom of action for an army. Any army which, losing the initiative, isforced into a passive position and ceases to have freedom of action, facesthe danger of defeat or extermination. Naturally, gaining the initiativeis harder in strategic defensive and interior-line operations and easierin offensive exterior-line operations. However, Japanese imperialism hastwo basic weaknesses, namely, its shortage of troops and the fact that itis fighting on foreign soil. Moreover, its underestimation of China's strengthand the internal contradictions among the Japanese militarists have givenrise to many mistakes in command, such as piecemeal reinforcement, lack ofstrategic coordination, occasional absence of a main direction for attack,failure to grasp opportunities in some operations and failure to wipe outencircled forces, all of which may be considered the third weakness of Japaneseimperialism. Thus, despite the advantage of being on the offensive and operatingon exterior lines, the Japanese militarists are gradually losing the initiative,because of their shortage of troops (their small territory, small population,inadequate resources, feudalistic imperialism, etc.), because of the factthat they are fighting on foreign soil (their war is imperialist and barbarous)and because of their stupidities in command. Japan is neither willing norable to conclude the war at present, nor has her strategic offensive yetcome to an end, but, as the general trend shows, her offensive is confinedwithin certain limits, which is the inevitable consequence of her threeweaknesses; she cannot go on indefinitely till she swallows the whole ofChina. Already there are signs that Japan will one day find herself in anutterly passive position. China, on the other hand, was in a rather passiveposition at the beginning of the war, but, having gained experience, sheis now turning to the new policy of mobile warfare, the policy of takingthe offensive, seeking quick decisions and operating on exterior lines incampaigns and battles, which, together with the policy of developingwidespread guerrilla warfare, is helping China to build up a position ofinitiative day by day.The question of the initiative is even more vital in guerrilla warfare. Formost guerrilla units operate in very difficult circumstances, fighting withouta rear, with their own weak forces facing the enemy's strong forces, lackingexperience (when the units are newly organized), being separated, etc.Nevertheless, it is possible to build up the initiative in guerrilla warfare,the essential condition being to seize on the enemy's three weaknesses. Takingadvantage of the enemy's shortage of troops (from the viewpoint of the waras a whole), the guerrilla units can boldly use vast areas as their fieldsof operation; taking advantage of the fact that the enemy is an alien invaderand is pursuing a most barbarous policy, the guerrilla units can boldly enlistthe support of millions upon millions of people; and taking advantage ofthe stupidities in the enemy's command, the guerrilla units can give fullscope to their resourcefulness. While the regular army must seize on allthese weaknesses of the enemy and turn them to good account in order to defeathim, it is even more important for the guerrilla units to do so. As for theguerrilla units' own weaknesses, they can be gradually reduced in the courseof the struggle. Moreover, these weaknesses sometimes constitute the verycondition for gaining the initiative. For example, it is precisely becausethe guerrilla units are small that they can mysteriously appear and disappearin their operations behind enemy lines, without the enemy's being able todo anything about them, and thus enjoy a freedom of action such as massiveregular armies never can.When the enemy is making a converging attack from several directions' a guerrillaunit can exercise initiative only with difficulty and can lose it all tooeasily. In such a case, if its appraisals and dispositions are wrong, itis liable to get into a passive position and consequently fail to smash theconverging enemy attack. This may occur even when the enemy is on the defensiveand we are on the offensive. For the initiative results from making a correctappraisal of the situation (both our own and that of the enemy) and frommaking the correct military and political dispositions. A pessimistic appraisalout of accord with the objective conditions and the passive dispositionsensuing from it will undoubtedly result in the loss of the initiative andthrow one into a passive position. On the other hand, an over-optimisticappraisal out of accord with the objective conditions and the risky(unjustifiably risky) dispositions ensuing from it will also result in theloss of the initiative and eventually land one in a position similar to thatof the pessimists. The initiative is not an innate attribute of genius, butis something an intelligent leader attains through open-minded study andcorrect appraisal of the objective conditions and through correct militaryand political dispositions. It follows that the initiative is not ready-madebut is something that requires conscious effort.When forced into a passive position through some incorrect appraisal anddisposition or through overwhelming pressure, a guerrilla unit must striveto extricate itself. How this can be done depends on the circumstances. Inmany cases it is necessary to "move away". The ability to move is the distinctivefeature of a guerrilla unit. To move away is the principal method for gettingout of a passive position and regaining the initiative. But it is not thesole method. The moment when the enemy is most energetic and we are in thegreatest difficulties is often the very moment when things begin to turnagainst him and in our favour. Frequently a favourable situation recurs andthe initiative is regained as a result of "holding out a little longer".Next, let us deal with flexibility.Flexibility is a concrete expression of the initiative. The flexible employmentof forces is more essential in guerrilla warfare than in regular warfare.A guerrilla commander must understand that the flexible employment of hisforces is the most important means of changing the situation as between theenemy and ourselves and of gaining the initiative. The nature of guerrillawarfare is such that guerrilla forces must be employed flexibly in accordancewith the task in hand and with such circumstances as the state of the enemy,the terrain and the local population, and the chief ways of employing theforces are dispersal, concentration and shifting of position. In employinghis forces, a guerrilla commander is like a fisherman casting his net, whichhe should be able to spread wide as well as draw in tight. When casting hisnet, the fisherman has to ascertain the depth of the water, the speed ofthe current and the presence or absence of obstructions; similarly, whendispersing his units, a guerrilla commander must take care not to incur lossesthrough ignorance of the situation or through miscalculated action. Justas the fisherman must keep a grip on the cord in order to draw his net intight, so the guerrilla commander must maintain liaison and communicationwith all his forces and keep enough of his main forces at hand. Just as afrequent change of position is necessary in fishing, so a frequent shiftof position is necessary for a guerrilla unit. Dispersal, concentration andshifting of position are the three ways of flexibly employing forces in guerrillawarfare.Generally speaking, the dispersal of guerrilla units, or "breaking up thewhole into parts", is employed chiefly: (1) when we want to threaten theenemy with a wide frontal attack because he is on the defensive, and thereis temporarily no chance to mass our forces for action; (2) when we wantto harass and disrupt the enemy throughout an area where his forces are weak;(3) when we are unable to break through the enemy's encirclement and tryto slip away by making ourselves less conspicuous; (4) when we are restrictedby terrain or supplies; or (5) when we are carrying on mass work over a widearea. But whatever the circumstances, when dispersing for action we shouldpay attention to the following: (1) we should never make an absolutelyeven dispersal of forces, but should keep a fairly large part in an areaconvenient for manoeuvre, so that any possible exigency can be met and thereis a centre of gravity for the task being carried out in dispersion; and(2) we should assign to the dispersed units clearly defined tasks, fieldsof operation, time limits for actions, places for reassembly and ways andmeans of liaison.Concentration of forces, or "assembling the parts into a whole", is the methodusually applied to destroy an enemy when he is on the offensive and sometimesto destroy some of his stationary forces when he is on the defensive.Concentration of forces does not mean absolute concentration, but the massingof the main forces for use in one important direction while retaining ordispatching part of the forces for use in other directions to contain, harassor disrupt the enemy, or to carry on mass work.Although the flexible dispersal or concentration of forces according tocircumstances is the principal method in guerrilla warfare, we must alsoknow how to shift (or transfer) our forces flexibly. When the enemy feelsseriously threatened by guerrillas, he will send troops to attack or suppressthem. Hence the guerrilla units will have to take stock of the situation.If advisable, they should fight where they are; if not, they should loseno time in shifting elsewhere. Sometimes, in order to crush the enemy unitsone by one, guerrilla units which have destroyed an enemy force in one placemay immediately shift to another so as to wipe out a second enemy force;sometimes, finding it inadvisable to fight in one place, they may have todisengage quickly and fight the enemy elsewhere. If the enemy's forces ina certain place present a particularly serious threat, the guerrilla unitsshould not linger, but should move off with lightning speed. In general,shifts of position should be made with secrecy and speed. In order to mislead,decoy and confuse the enemy, they should constantly use stratagems, suchas making a feint to the east but attacking in the west, appearing now inthe south and now in the north, hit-and-run attacks, and night actions.Flexibility in dispersal, concentration and shifts of position is a concreteexpression of the initiative in guerrilla warfare, whereas rigidness andinertia inevitably lead to passivity and cause unnecessary losses. But acommander proves himself wise not just by recognition of the importance ofemploying his forces flexibly but by skill in dispersing, concentrating orshifting them in good time according to the specific circumstances. Thiswisdom in sensing changes and choosing the right moment to act is not easilyacquired; it can be gained only by those who study with a receptive mindand investigate and ponder diligently. Prudent consideration of the circumstancesis essential to prevent flexibility from turning into impulsive action.Lastly, we come to planning.Without planning, victories in guerrilla warfare are impossible. Any ideathat guerrilla warfare can be conducted in haphazard fashion indicates eithera flippant attitude or ignorance of guerrilla warfare. The operations ina guerrilla zone as a whole, or those of a guerrilla unit or formation, mustbe preceded by as thorough planning as possible, by preparation in advancefor every action. Grasping the situation, setting the tasks, disposing theforces, giving military and political training, securing supplies, puttingthe equipment in good order, making proper use of the people's help, etc.--allthese are part of the work of the guerrilla commanders, which they must carefullyconsider and conscientiously perform and check up on. There can be no initiative,no flexibility, and no offensive unless they do so. True, guerrilla conditionsdo not allow as high a degree of planning as do those of regular warfare,and it would be a mistake to attempt very thorough planning in guerrillawarfare. But it is necessary to plan as thoroughly as the objective conditionspermit, for it should be understood that fighting the enemy is no joke.The above points serve to explain the first of the strategic principles ofguerrilla warfare, the principle of using initiative, flexibility and planningin conducting offensives within the defensive, battles of quick decisionwithin protracted war, and exterior-line operations within interior-lineoperations. It is the key problem in the strategy of guerrilla warfare. Thesolution of this problem provides the major guarantee of victory in guerrillawarfare so far as military command is concerned.Although a variety of matters have been dealt with here, they all revolvearound the offensive in campaigns and battles. The initiative can be decisivelygrasped only after victory in an offensive. Every offensive operation mustbe organized on our initiative and not launched under compulsion. Flexibilityin the employment of forces revolves around the effort to take the offensive,and planning likewise is necessary chiefly in order to ensure success inoffensive operations. Measures of tactical defence are meaningless if theyare divorced from their role of giving either direct or indirect supportto an offensive. Quick decision refers to the tempo of an offensive, andexterior lines refer to its scope. The offensive is the only means of destroyingthe enemy and is also the principal means of self-preservation, while puredefence and retreat can play only a temporary and partial role inself-preservation and are quite useless for destroying the enemy.The principle stated above is basically the same for both regular and guerrillawar; it differs to some degree only in its form of expression. But in guerrillawar it is both important and necessary to note this difference. It is preciselythis difference in form which distinguishes the operational methods of guerrillawar from those of regular war. If we confuse the two different forms inwhich the principle is expressed, victory in guerrilla war will beimpossible. CHAPTER V CO-ORDINATION WITH REGULAR WARFAREThe second problem of strategy in guerrilla warfare is its coordination withregular warfare. It is a matter of clarifying the relation between guerrillaand regular warfare on the operational level, in the light of the natureof actual guerrilla operations. An understanding of this relation is veryimportant for effectiveness in defeating the enemy.There are three kinds of co-ordination between guerrilla and regular warfare,co-ordination in strategy, in campaigns and in battles.Taken as a whole, guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines, which cripplesthe enemy, pins him down, disrupts his supply lines and inspires the regularforces and the people throughout the country, is co-ordinated with regularwarfare in strategy. Take the case of the guerrilla warfare in the threenortheastern provinces. Of course, the question of co-ordination did notarise before the nation-wide War of Resistance, but since the war began thesignificance of such coordination has become obvious. Every enemy soldierthe guerrillas kill there, every bullet they make the enemy expend, everyenemy soldier they stop from advancing south of the Great Wall, can be reckoneda contribution to the total strength of the resistance. It is, moreover,clear that they are having a demoralizing effect on the whole enemy armyand all Japan and a heartening effect on our whole army and people. Stillclearer is the role in strategic co-ordination played by the guerrilla warfarealong the Peiping-Suiyuan, Peiping-Hankow, Tientsin-Pukow, Tatung-Puchow,Chengting-Taiyuan and Shanghai-Hangchow Railways. Not only are the guerrillaunits performing the function of co-ordination with the regular forces inour present strategic defensive, when the enemy is on the strategic offensive;not only will they co-ordinate with the regular forces in disrupting theenemy's hold on the occupied territory, after he concludes his strategicoffensive and switches to the safeguarding of his gains; they will alsoco-ordinate with the regular forces in driving out the enemy forces andrecovering all the lost territories, when the regular forces launch the strategiccounter-offensive. The great role of guerrilla warfare in strategic coordinationmust not be overlooked. The commanders both of the guerrilla units and ofthe regular forces must clearly understand this role.In addition, guerrilla warfare performs the function of coordination withregular warfare in campaigns. For instance, in the campaign at Hsinkou, northof Taiyuan, the guerrillas played a remarkable role in co-ordination bothnorth and south of Yenmenkuan by wrecking the Tatung-Puchow Railway and themotor roads running through Pinghsingkuan and Yangfangkou. Or take anotherinstance. After the enemy occupied Fenglingtu, guerrilla warfare, which wasalready widespread throughout Shansi Province and was conducted mainly bythe regular forces, played an even greater role through co-ordination withthe defensive campaigns west of the Yellow River in Shensi Province and southof the Yellow River in Honan Province. Again, when the enemy attacked southernShantung, the guerrilla warfare in the five provinces of northern Chinacontributed a great deal through co-ordination with the campaigns of ourarmy. In performing a task of this sort, the leaders of each guerrilla basebehind the enemy lines, or the commanders of a guerrilla formation temporarilydispatched there, must dispose their forces well and, by adopting differenttactics suited to the time and place, move energetically against the enemy'smost vital and vulnerable spots in order to cripple him, pin him down, disrupthis supply lines, inspire our armies campaigning on the interior lines, andso fulfil their duty of co-ordinating with the campaign. If each guerrillazone or unit goes it alone without giving any attention to co-ordinatingwith the campaigns of the regular forces, its role in strategic co-ordinationwill lose a great deal of its significance, although it will still play somesuch role in the general strategy. All guerrilla commanders should give thispoint serious attention. To achieve co-ordination in campaigns, it is absolutelynecessary for all larger guerrilla units and guerrilla formations to haveradio equipment.Finally, co-ordination with the regular forces in battles, in actual fightingon the battlefield, is the task of all guerrilla units in the vicinity ofan interior-line battlefield. Of course, this applies only to guerrilla unitsoperating close to the regular forces or to units of regulars dispatchedon temporary guerrilla missions. In such cases, a guerrilla unit has to performwhatever task it is assigned by the commander of the regular forces, whichis usually to pin down some of the enemy's forces, disrupt his supply lines,conduct reconnaissance, or act as guides for the regular forces. Even withoutsuch an assignment the guerrilla unit should carry out these tasks on itsown initiative. To sit by idly, neither moving nor fighting, or to move aboutwithout fighting, would be an intolerable attitude for a guerrilla unit. CHAPTER VI THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BASE AREAS The third problem of strategy in anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare is theestablishment of base areas, which is important and essential because ofthe protracted nature and ruthlessness of the war. The recovery of our lostterritories will have to await the nation-wide strategic counter-offensive;by then the enemy's front will have extended deep into central China andcut it in two from north to south, and a part or even a greater part of ourterritory will have fallen into the hands of the enemy and become his rear.We shall have to extend guerrilla warfare all over this vast enemy-occupiedarea, make a front out of the enemy's rear, and force him to fight ceaselesslythroughout the territory he occupies. Until such time as our strategiccounteroffensive is launched and so long as our lost territories are notrecovered, it will be necessary to persist in guerrilla warfare in the enemy'srear, certainly for a fairly long time, though one cannot say definitelyfor how long. This is why the war will be a protracted one. And in orderto safeguard his gains in the occupied areas, the enemy is bound to stepup his anti-guerrilla measures and, especially after the halting of his strategicoffensive, to embark on relentless suppression of the guerrillas. Withruthlessness thus added to protractedness, it will be impossible to sustainguerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines without base areas.What, then, are these base areas? They are the strategic bases on which theguerrilla forces rely in performing their strategic tasks and achieving theobject of preserving and expanding themselves and destroying and drivingout the enemy. Without such strategic bases, there will be nothing to dependon in carrying out any of our strategic tasks or achieving the aim of thewar. It is a characteristic of guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines thatit is fought without a rear, for the guerrilla forces are severed from thecountry's general rear. But guerrilla warfare could not last long or growwithout base areas. The base areas, indeed, are its rear.History knows many peasant wars of the "roving rebel" type, but none of themever succeeded. In the present age of advanced communications and technology,it would be all the more groundless to imagine that one can win victory byfighting in the manner of roving rebels. However, this roving-rebel ideastill exists among impoverished peasants, and in the minds of guerrillacommanders it becomes the view that base areas are neither necessary norimportant. Therefore ridding the minds of guerrilla commanders of this ideais a prerequisite for deciding on a policy of establishing base areas. Thequestion of whether or not to have base areas and of whether or not to regardthem as important, in other words, the conflict between the idea of establishingbase areas and that of fighting like roving rebels, arises in all guerrillawarfare, and, to a certain extent, our anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare isno exception. Therefore the struggle against the roving-rebel ideology isan inevitable process. Only when this ideology is thoroughly overcome andthe policy of establishing base areas is mutated and applied will there beconditions favourable for the maintenance of guerrilla warfare over a longperiod.Now that the necessity and importance of base areas have been made clear,let us pass on to the following problems which must be understood and solvedwhen it comes to establishing the base areas. These problems are the typesof base areas, the guerrilla zones and the base areas, the conditions forestablishing base areas, their consolidation and expansion, and the formsin which we and the enemy encircle one another. 1. THE TYPES OF BASE AREASBase areas in anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare are mainly of three types,those in the mountains, those on the plains and those in the river-lake-estuaryregions.The advantage of setting up base areas in mountainous regions is obvious,and those which have been, are being or will be established in the Changpai,[1] Wutai, [2] Taihang,[3] Taishan, [4] Yenshan[5] and Maoshan [6] Mountainsall belong to this type. They are all places where anti-Japanese guerrillawarfare can be maintained for the longest time and are important strongholdsfor the War of Resistance. We must develop guerrilla warfare and set up baseareas in all the mountainous regions behind the enemy lines.Of course, the plains are less suitable than the mountains, but it is byno means impossible to develop guerrilla warfare or establish any base areasthere. Indeed, the widespread guerrilla warfare in the plains of Hopei andof northern and northwestern Shantung proves that it is possible to developguerrilla warfare in the plains. While there is as yet no evidence on thepossibility of setting up base areas there and maintaining them for long,it has been proved that the setting up of temporary base areas is possible,and it should be possible to set up base areas for small units or for seasonaluse. On the one hand, the enemy does not have enough troops at his disposaland is pursuing a policy of unparalleled brutality, and on the other hand,China has a vast territory and vast numbers of people who are resisting Japan;the objective conditions for spreading guerrilla warfare and setting up temporarybase areas in the plains are therefore fulfilled. Given competent militarycommand, it should of course be possible to establish bases for small guerrillaunits there, bases which are long-term but notfixed.[7] Broadly speaking, when the strategicoffensive of the enemy is brought to a halt and he enters the stage ofsafeguarding his occupied areas, he will undoubtedly launch savage attackson all the guerrilla base areas, and those in the plains will naturally bethe first to bear the brunt. The large guerrilla formations operating onthe plains will be unable to keep on fighting there for long and will graduallyhave to move up into the mountains as the circumstances require, as for instance,from the Hopei Plain to the Wutai and Taihang Mountains, or from the ShantungPlain to Taishan Mountain and the Shantung Peninsula in the east. But inthe circumstances of our national war it is not impossible for numerous smallguerrilla units to keep going in various counties over the vast plains andadopt a fluid way of fighting, i.e., by shifting their bases fromplace to place. It is definitely possible to conduct seasonal guerrilla warfareby taking advantage of the "green curtain" of tall crops in summer and ofthe frozen rivers in winter. As the enemy has no strength to spare now andwill never be able to attend to everything even when he has the strengthto spare, it is absolutely necessary for us to decide on the policy, forthe present, of spreading guerrilla warfare far and wide and setting up temporarybase areas in the plains and, for the future, of preparing to keep up guerrillawarfare by small units, if only seasonally, and of creating base areas whichare not fixed.Objectively speaking, the possibilities of developing guerrilla warfare andestablishing base areas are greater in the river-lake-estuary regions thanin the plains, though less than in the mountains. The dramatic battles foughtby "pirates" and "water-bandits", of which our history is full, and the guerrillawarfare round the Hunghu Lake kept up for several years in the Red Army period,both testify to the possibility of developing guerrilla warfare and ofestablishing base areas in the river-lake-estuary regions. So far, however,the political parties and the masses who are resisting Japan have given thispossibility little attention. Though the subjective conditions are as yetlacking, we should undoubtedly turn our attention to this possibility andstart working on it. As one aspect in the development of our nation-wideguerrilla warfare, we should effectively organize guerrilla warfare in theHungtse Lake region north of the Yangtse River, in the Taihu Lake regionsouth of the Yangtse, and in all river-lake-estuary regions in the enemy-occupiedareas along the rivers and on the seacoast, and we should create permanentbase areas in and near such places. By overlooking this aspect we are virtuallyproviding the enemy with water transport facilities; this is a gap in ourstrategic plan for the War of Resistance which must be filled in good time. 2. GUERRILLA ZONES AND BASE AREASIn guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines, there is a difference betweenguerrilla zones and base areas. Areas which are surrounded by the enemy butwhose central parts are not occupied or have been recovered, like some countiesin the Wutai mountain region (i.e., the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei borderarea) and also some places in the Taihang and Taishan mountain regions, areready-made bases for the convenient use of guerrilla units in developingguerrilla warfare. But elsewhere in these areas the situation is different,as for instance in the eastern and northern sections of the Wutai mountainregion, which include parts of western Hopei and southern Chahar, and inmany places east of Paoting and west of Tsangchow. When guerrilla warfarebegan, the guerrillas could not completely occupy these places but couldonly make frequent raids; they are areas which are held by the guerrillaswhen they are there and by the puppet regime when they are gone, and aretherefore not yet guerrilla bases but only what may be called guerrilla zones.Such guerrilla zones will be transformed into base areas when they have gonethrough the necessary processes of guerrilla warfare, that is, when largenumbers of enemy troops have been annihilated or defeated there, the puppetregime has been destroyed, the masses have been roused to activity, anti-Japanesemass organizations have been formed, people's local armed forces have beendeveloped, and anti-Japanese political power has been established. By theexpansion of our base areas we mean the addition of areas such as these tothe bases already established.In some places, for example, eastern Hopei, the whole area of guerrillaoperations has been a guerrilla zone from the very beginning. The puppetregime is of long standing there, and from the beginning the whole area ofoperations has been a guerrilla zone both for the people's armed forces thathave grown out of local uprisings and for the guerrilla detachments dispatchedfrom the Wutai Mountains. At the outset of their activities, all they coulddo was to choose some fairly good spots there as temporary rear or base areas.Such places will not be transformed from guerrilla zones into relativelystable base areas until the enemy forces are destroyed and the work of arousingthe people is in full swing.Thus the transformation of a guerrilla zone into a base area is an arduouscreative process, and its accomplishment depends on the extent to which theenemy is destroyed and the masses are aroused.Many regions will remain guerrilla zones for a long time. In these regionsthe enemy will not be able to set up stable puppet regimes, however muchhe tries to maintain control, while we, on our part, will not be able toachieve the aim of establishing anti-Japanese political power, however muchwe develop guerrilla warfare. Examples of this kind are to be found in theenemy-occupied regions along the railway lines, in the neighbourhood of bigcities and in certain areas in the plains.As for the big cities, the railway stops and the areas in the plains whichare strongly garrisoned by the enemy, guerrilla warfare can only extend tothe fringes and not right into these places which have relatively stablepuppet regimes. This is another kind of situation.Mistakes in our leadership or strong enemy pressure may cause a reversalof the state of affairs described above, i.e., a guerrilla basemay turn into a guerrilla zone, and a guerrilla zone may turn into an areaunder relatively stable enemy occupation. Such changes are possible, andthey deserve special vigilance on the part of guerrilla commanders.Therefore, as a result of guerrilla warfare and the struggle between us andthe enemy, the entire enemy-occupied territory will fall into the followingthree categories: first, anti-Japanese bases held by our guerrilla unitsand our organs of political power; second, areas held by Japanese imperialismand its puppet regimes; and third, intermediate zones contested by both sides,namely, guerrilla zones. Guerrilla commanders have the duty to expand thefirst and third categories to the maximum and to reduce the second categoryto the minimum. This is the strategic task of guerrilla warfare. 3. CONDITIONS FOR ESTABLISHING BASE AREASThe fundamental conditions for establishing a base area are that there shouldbe anti-Japanese armed forces, that these armed forces should be employedto inflict defeats on the enemy and that they should arouse the people toaction. Thus the establishment of a base area is first and foremost a matterof building an armed force. Leaders in guerrilla war must devote their energyto building one or more guerrilla units, and must gradually develop themin the course of struggle into guerrilla formations or even into units andformations of regular troops. The building up of an armed force is the keyto establishing a base area; if there is no armed force or if the armed forceis weak, nothing can be done. This constitutes the first condition.The second indispensable condition for establishing a base area is that thearmed forces should be used in co-ordination with the people to defeat theenemy. All places under enemy control are enemy, and not guerrilla,base areas, and obviously cannot be transformed into guerrilla base areasunless the enemy is defeated. Unless we repulse the enemy's attacks and defeathim, even places held by the guerrillas will come under enemy control, andthen it will be impossible to establish base areas.The third indispensable condition for establishing a base area is the useof all our strength, including our armed forces, to arouse the masses forstruggle against Japan. In the course of this struggle we must arm the people,i.e., organize self-defence corps and guerrilla units. In the courseof this struggle, we must form mass organizations, we must organize the workers,peasants, youth, women, children, merchants and professional people--accordingto the degree of their political consciousness and fighting enthusiasm--intothe various mass organizations necessary for the struggle against Japaneseaggression, and we must gradually expand them. Without organization, thepeople cannot give effect to their anti-Japanese strength. In the courseof this struggle, we must weed out the open and the hidden traitors, a taskwhich can be accomplished only by relying on the strength of the people.In this struggle, it is particularly important to arouse the people to establish,or to consolidate, their local organs of anti-Japanese political power. Wherethe original Chinese organs of political power have not been destroyed bythe enemy, we must reorganize and strengthen them with the support of thebroad masses, and where they have been destroyed by the enemy, we shouldrebuild them by the efforts of the masses. They are organs of political powerfor carrying out the policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front andshould unite all the forces of the people to fight against our sole enemy,Japanese imperialism, and its jackals, the traitors and reactionaries.A base area for guerrilla war can be truly established only with the gradualfulfillment of the three basic conditions, i.e., only after theanti-Japanese armed forces are built up, the enemy has suffered defeats andthe people are aroused.Mention must also be made of geographical and economic conditions. As forthe former, we have already discussed three different categories in the earliersection on the types of base areas, and here we need only mention one majorrequirement, namely, that the area must be extensive. In places surroundedby the enemy on all sides, or on three sides, the mountainous regions naturallyoffer the best conditions for setting up base areas which can hold out fora long time, but the main thing is that there must be enough room for theguerrillas to maneuver, namely, the areas have to be extensive. Given anextensive area, guerrilla warfare can be developed and sustained even inthe plains, not to mention the river-lake-estuary regions. By and large,the vastness of China's territory and the enemy's shortage of troops provideguerrilla warfare in China with this condition. This is an important, evena primary condition, as far as the possibility of waging guerrilla warfareis concerned, and small countries like Belgium which lack this conditionhave few or no such possibilities.[8] In China,this condition is not something which has to be striven for, nor does itpresent a problem; it is there physically, waiting only to be exploited.So far as their physical setting is concerned, the economic conditions resemblethe geographical conditions. For now we are discussing the establishmentof base areas not in a desert, where no enemy is to be found, but behindthe enemy lines; every place the enemy can penetrate already has its Chineseinhabitants and an economic basis for subsistence, so that the question ofchoice of economic conditions in establishing base areas simply does notarise. Irrespective of the economic conditions, we should do our utmost todevelop guerrilla warfare and set up permanent or temporary base areas inall places where Chinese inhabitants and enemy forces are to be found. Ina political sense, however, the economic conditions do present a problem,a problem of economic policy which is of immense importance to the establishmentof base areas. The economic policy of the guerrilla base areas must followthe principles of the Anti-Japanese National United Front by equitablydistributing the financial burden and protecting commerce. Neither the localorgans of political power nor the guerrilla units must violate these principles,or otherwise the establishment of base areas and the maintenance of guerrillawarfare would be adversely affected. The equitable distribution of the financialburden means that "those with money should contribute money", while the peasantsshould supply the guerrilla units with grain within certain limits. Theprotection of commerce means that the guerrilla units should be highlydisciplined and that the confiscation of shops, except those owned by provedtraitors, should be strictly prohibited. This is no easy matter, but thepolicy is set and must be put into effect. 4. THE CONSOLIDATION AND EXPANSION OF BASE AREASIn order to confine the enemy invaders to a few strongholds, that is, tothe big cities and along the main communication lines, the guerrillas mustdo all they can to extend guerrilla warfare from their base areas as widelyas possible and hem in all the enemy's strongholds, thus threatening hisexistence and shaking his morale while expanding the base areas. This isessential. In this context, we must oppose conservatism in guerrilla warfare.Whether originating in the desire for an easy life or in overestimation ofthe enemy's strength, conservatism can only bring losses in the War of Resistanceand is harmful to guerrilla warfare and to the base areas themselves. Atthe same time, we must not forget the consolidation of the base areas, thechief task being to arouse and organize the masses and to train guerrillaunits and local armed forces. Such consolidation is needed for maintainingprotracted warfare and also for expansion, and in its absence energetic expansionis impossible. If we attend only to expansion and forget about consolidationin our guerrilla warfare, we shall be unable to withstand the enemy's attacks,and consequently not only forfeit the possibility of expansion but also endangerthe very existence of the base areas. The correct principle is expansionwith consolidation, which is a good method and allows us to take the offensiveor the defensive as we choose. Given a protracted war, the problem ofconsolidating and expanding base areas constantly arises for every guerrillaunit. The concrete solution depends, of course, on the circumstances. Atone time, the emphasis may be on expansion, i.e., on expanding theguerrilla zones and increasing the number of guerrillas. At another, theemphasis may be on consolidation, i.e., on organizing the massesand training the troops. As expansion and consolidation differ in nature,and as the military dispositions and other tasks will differ accordingly,an effective solution of the problem is possible only if we alternate theemphasis according to time and circumstances. 5. FORMS IN WHICH WE AND THE ENEMY ENCIRCLE ONE ANOTHERTaking the War of Resistance as a whole, there is no doubt that we arestrategically encircled by the enemy, because he is on the strategic offensiveand is operating on exterior lines while we are on the strategic defensiveand are operating on interior lines. This is the first form of enemyencirclement. We on our part encircle each of the enemy columns advancingon us along separate routes, because we apply the policy of the offensiveand of exterior-line operations in campaigns and battles by using numericallypreponderant forces against these enemy columns advancing on us from exteriorlines. This is the first form of our encirclement of the enemy. Next, ifwe consider the guerrilla base areas in the enemy's rear, each area takensingly is surrounded by the enemy on all sides, like the Wutai mountain region,or on three sides, like the northwestern Shansi area. This is the secondform of enemy encirclement. However, if one considers all the guerrilla baseareas together and in their relation to the battle fronts of the regularforces, one can see that we in turn surround a great many enemy forces. InShansi Province, for instance, we have surrounded the Tatung-Puchow Railwayon three sides (the east and west flanks and the southern end) and the cityof Taiyuan on all sides; and there are many similar instances in Hopei andShantung Provinces. This is the second form of our encirclement of the enemy.Thus there are two forms of encirclement by the enemy forces and two formsof encirclement by our own--rather like a game ofweichi.[9] Campaigns and battlesfought by the two sides resemble the capturing of each other's pieces, andthe establishment of strongholds by the enemy and of guerrilla base areasby us resembles moves to dominate spaces on the board. It is in the matterof "dominating the spaces" that the great strategic role of guerrilla baseareas in the rear of the enemy is revealed. We are raising this questionin the War of Resistance in order that the nation's military authoritiesand the guerrilla commanders in all areas should place on the agenda thedevelopment of guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines and the establishmentof base areas wherever possible, and carry this out as a strategic task.If on the international plane we can create an anti-Japanese front in thePacific region, with China as one strategic unit, and the Soviet Union andother countries which may join it as other strategic units, we shall thenhave one more form of encirclement against the enemy than he has againstus and bring about exterior-line operations in the Pacific region by whichto encircle and destroy fascist Japan. To be sure, this is of little practicalsignificance at present, but such a prospect is not impossible. CHAPTER VII THE STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE AND THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE IN GUERRILLA WAR The fourth problem of strategy in guerrilla war concerns the strategic defensiveand the strategic offensive. This is the problem of how the policy of offensivewarfare, which we mentioned in our discussion of the first problem, is tobe carried out in practice, when we are on the defensive and when we areon the offensive in our guerrilla warfare against Japan.Within the nation-wide strategic defensive or strategic offensive (to bemore exact, the strategic counter-offensive), small-scale strategic defensivesand offensives take place in and around each guerrilla base area. By strategicdefensive we mean our strategic situation and policy when the enemy is onthe offensive and we are on the defensive; by strategic offensive we meanour strategic situation and policy when the enemy is on the defensive andwe are on the offensive. 1. THE STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE IN GUERRILLA WARAfter guerrilla warfare has broken out and grown to a considerable extent,the enemy will inevitably attack the guerrilla base areas, especially inthe period when his strategic offensive against the country as a whole isbrought to an end and he adopts the policy of safeguarding his occupied areas.It is essential to recognize the inevitability of such attacks, for otherwisethe guerrilla commanders will be caught wholly unprepared, and in the faceof heavy enemy attacks they will undoubtedly become alarmed and confusedand their forces will be routed.To wipe out the guerrillas and their base areas, the enemy frequently resortsto converging attacks. For instance, in each of the four or five "punitiveexpeditions" directed against the Wutai mountain region, the enemy made aplanned advance in three, four or even six or seven columns simultaneously.The larger the scale of the guerrilla fighting, the more important the positionof the base areas, and the greater the threat to the enemy's strategic centresand vital communication lines, the fiercer will be the enemy's attacks.Therefore, the fiercer the enemy's attacks on a guerrilla area, the greaterthe indication that the guerrilla warfare there is successful and is beingeffectively coordinated with the regular fighting.When the enemy launches a converging attack in several columns, the guerrillapolicy should be to smash it by counter-attack. It can be easily smashedif each advancing enemy column consists of only one unit, whether big orsmall, has no follow-up units and is unable to station troops along the routeof advance, construct blockhouses or build motor roads. When the enemy launchesa converging attack, he is on the offensive and operating on exterior lines,while we are on the defensive and operating on interior lines. As for ourdispositions, we should use our secondary forces to pin down several enemycolumns, while our main force should launch surprise attacks (chiefly inthe form of ambushes) in a campaign or battle against a single enemy column,striking it when it is on the move. The enemy, though strong, will be weakenedby repeated surprise attacks and will often withdraw when he is halfway;the guerrilla units can then make more surprise attacks during the pursuitand weaken him still further. The enemy generally occupies the county townsor other towns in our base areas before he stops his offensive or beginsto withdraw, and we should encircle these towns, cutting off his grain supplyand severing his communications, so that when he cannot hold out and beginsto retreat, we can seize the opportunity to pursue and attack him. Aftersmashing one column, we should shift our forces to smash another, and, bysmashing them one by one, shatter the converging attack.A big base area like the Wutai mountain region forms a military area, whichis divided into four or five, or even more, military subareas, each withits own armed forces operating independently. By employing the tactics describedabove, these forces have often smashed the enemy's attacks simultaneouslyor successively.In our plan of operations against a converging attack by the enemy, we generallyplace our main force on interior lines. But when we have the strength tospare, we should use our secondary forces (such as the county or the districtguerrilla units, or even detachments of the main force) on exterior linesto disrupt the enemy's communications and pin down his reinforcements. Shouldthe enemy stay put in our base area, we may reverse the tactics, namely,leave some of our forces in the base area to invest the enemy while employingthe main force to attack the region whence he has come and to step up ouractivities there, in order to induce him to withdraw and attack our mainforce; this is the tactic of "relieving the state of Chao by besieging thestate of Wei".[10]In the course of operations against a converging attack, the local anti-Japaneseself-defence corps and all the mass organizations should mobilize for actionand in every way help our troops to fight the enemy. In fighting the enemy,it is important both to enforce local martial law and, as far as possible,to "strengthen our defence works and clear the fields". The purpose of theformer is to suppress traitors and prevent the enemy from getting information,and of the latter to assist our own operations (by strengthening our defenceworks) and prevent the enemy from getting food (by clearing the herds). "Clearingthe fields" means harvesting the crops as soon as they are ripe.When the enemy retreats, he often burns down the houses in the cities andtowns he has occupied and razes the villages along his route, with the purposeof destroying the guerrilla base areas; but in so doing he deprives himselfof shelter and food in his next offensive, and the damage recoils upon hisown head. This is a concrete illustration of what we mean by one and thesame thing having two contradictory aspects.A guerrilla commander should not think of abandoning his base area and shiftingto another, unless it proves impossible, after repeated operations to smashthe enemy's heavy converging attacks. In these circumstances he must guardagainst pessimism. So long as the leaders do not blunder in matters of principle,it is generally possible to smash the converging attacks and hold on to thebase areas in the mountainous regions. It is only in the plains that, whenconfronted by a heavy converging attack, the guerrilla commander should considerother measures in the light of the specific circumstances, namely, leavingmany small units for scattered operations, while temporarily shifting largeguerrilla formations to some mountainous region, so that they can returnand resume their activities in the plains once the main forces of the enemymove away.Generally speaking, the Japanese cannot adopt the principle of blockhousewarfare, which the Kuomintang employed in the days of the civil war, becausetheir forces are inadequate in relation to China's vast territory. However,we should reckon with the possibility that they may use it to some extentagainst those guerrilla base areas which pose a particular threat to theirvital positions, but even in such circumstances we should be prepared tokeep up guerrilla warfare in those areas. Since we have had the experienceof being able to maintain guerrilla warfare during the civil war, there isnot the slightest doubt of our greater capacity to do so in a national war.Though, in point of relative military strength, the enemy can throw forcesthat are vastly superior in quantity as well as in quality against some ofour base areas, there remain the insoluble national contradiction betweenus and the enemy and the unavoidable weaknesses of his command. Our victoriesare based on thorough work among the masses and flexible tactics in ouroperations. 2. THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE IN GUERRILLA WARAfter we have smashed an enemy offensive and before the enemy starts a newoffensive, he is on the strategic defensive and we are on the strategicoffensive.At such times our operational policy is not to attack enemy forces whichare entrenched in defensive positions and which we are not sure of defeating,but systematically to destroy or drive out the small enemy units and puppetforces in certain areas, which our guerrilla units are strong enough to dealwith, and to expand our areas, arouse the masses for struggle against Japan,replenish and train our troops and organize new guerrilla units. If the enemystill remains on the defensive when these tasks are under way, we can expandour new areas still further and attack weakly garrisoned cities and communicationlines and hold them for as long as circumstances permit. These are all tasksof the strategic offensive, and the purpose is to take advantage of the factthat the enemy is on the defensive so that we may effectively build up ourown military and mass strength, effectively reduce the enemy's strength andprepare to smash the enemy methodically and vigorously when he mounts anoffensive again.It is essential to rest and train our troops, and the best time for doingso is when the enemy is on the defensive. It is not a question of shuttingourselves off from everything else for rest and training, but of fundingtime for rest and training while expanding our areas, mopping up small enemyunits and arousing the people. This is usually also the time for tacklingthe difficult problem of getting food supplies, bedding, clothing, etc.It is also the time for destroying the enemy's communication lines on a largescale, hampering his transport and giving direct support to the regular forcesin their campaigns.At such times the guerrilla base areas, guerrilla zones and guerrilla unitsare in high spirits, and the areas devastated by the enemy are graduallyrehabilitated and revived. The people in the enemy-occupied territories arealso delighted, and the fame of the guerrillas resounds everywhere. On theother hand, in the camp of the enemy and his running dogs, the traitors,panic and disintegration are mounting, while there is growing hatred of theguerrillas and their base areas and preparations to deal with them areintensified. During the strategic offensive, therefore, it is impermissiblefor the guerrilla commanders to become so elated as to underrate the enemyand forget to strengthen unity in their own ranks and to consolidate theirbase areas and their forces. At such times, they must skilfully watch theenemy's every move for signs of any new offensive against us, so that themoment it comes they can wind up their strategic offensive in good order,turn to the strategic defensive and thereby smash the enemy's offensive CHAPTER VIII DEVELOPMENT OF GUERRILLA WAR INTO MOBILE WARThe fifth problem of strategy in guerrilla war against Japan is its developmentinto mobile war, a development which is necessary and possible because thewar is protracted and ruthless. If China could speedily defeat the Japaneseinvaders and recover her lost territories, and if the war were neither protractednor ruthless, this would not be necessary. But as, on the contrary, the waris protracted and ruthless, guerrilla warfare cannot adapt itself to sucha war except by developing into mobile warfare. Since the war is protractedand ruthless, it is possible for the guerrilla units to undergo the necessarysteeling and gradually to transform themselves into regular forces, so thattheir mode of operations is gradually regularized and guerrilla warfare developsinto mobile warfare. The necessity and possibility of this development mustbe clearly recognized by the guerrilla commanders if they are to persistin, and systematically carry out, the policy of turning guerrilla warfareinto mobile warfare.In many places, such as the Wutai mountain region, the present guerrillawarfare owes its growth to the strong detachments sent there by the regularforces. The operations there, though generally of a guerrilla character,have contained an element of mobile warfare from the very beginning. Thiselement will gradually increase as the war goes on. Herein lies the advantagewhich makes possible the swift expansion of the present anti-Japanese guerrillawarfare and its rapid development to a higher level; thus the conditionsfor guerrilla warfare are far superior to what they were in the threenortheastern provinces.To transform guerrilla units waging guerrilla warfare into regular forceswaging mobile warfare, two conditions are necessary--an increase in numbers,and an improvement in quality. Apart from directly mobilizing the peopleto join the forces, increased numbers can be attained by amalgamating smallunits, while better quality depends on steeling the fighters and improvingtheir weapons in the course of the war.In amalgamating small units, we must, on the one hand, guard against localism,whereby attention is concentrated exclusively on local interests andcentralization is impeded, and, on the other, guard against the purely militaryapproach, whereby local interests are brushed aside.Localism exists among the local guerrilla units and local governments, whichare frequently preoccupied with local considerations to the neglect of thegeneral interest, or which prefer to act each on its own because they areunaccustomed to acting in larger groups. The commanders of the main guerrillaunits or of the guerrilla formations must take this into account and adoptthe method of gradual amalgamation of part of the local units, allowing thelocalities to keep some of their forces and expand their guerrilla warfare;the commanders should draw these units into joint operations and then bringabout their amalgamation without breaking up their original organizationor reshuffling their cadres, so that the small groups may integrate smoothlyinto the larger group.As against localism, the purely military approach represents the wrong viewpointheld in the main forces by those who are bent on expanding their own strengthand who neglect to assist the local armed units. They do not realize thatthe development of guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare means not theabandonment of guerrilla warfare but the gradual formation, in the midstof widespread guerrilla warfare, of a main force capable of conducting mobilewarfare, a force around which there must still be numerous guerrilla unitscarrying on extensive guerrilla operations. These guerrilla units are powerfulauxiliaries to the main force and serve as inexhaustible reserves for itscontinuous growth. Therefore, if a commander of a main force has made themistake of neglecting the interests of the local population and the localgovernment as a result of a purely military approach, he must correct itin order that the expansion of the main force and the multiplication of thelocal armed units may both receive due attention.To raise the quality of the guerrilla units it is imperative to raise theirpolitical and organizational level and improve their equipment, militarytechnique, tactics and discipline, so that they gradually pattern themselveson the regular forces and shed their guerrilla ways. Politically, it isimperative to get both the commanders and the fighters to realize the necessityof raising the guerrilla units to the level of the regular forces, to encouragethem to strive towards this end, and to guarantee its attainment by meansof political work. Organizationally, it is imperative gradually to fulfilall the requirements of a regular formation in the following respects--militaryand political organs, staff and working methods, a regular supply system,a medical service, etc. In the matter of equipment, it is imperative to acquirebetter and more varied weapons and increase the supply of the necessarycommunications equipment. In the matter of military technique and tactics,it is imperative to raise the guerrilla units to the level required of aregular formation. In the matter of discipline, it is imperative to raisethe level so that uniform standards are observed, every order is executedwithout fail and all slackness is eliminated. To accomplish all these tasksrequires a prolonged effort, and it cannot be done overnight; but that isthe direction in which we must develop. Only thus can a main force be builtup in each guerrilla base area and mobile warfare emerge for more effectiveattacks on the enemy. Where detachments or cadres have been sent in by theregular forces, the goal can be achieved more easily. Hence all the regularforces have the responsibility of helping the guerrilla units to developinto regular units. CHAPTER IX THE RELATIONSHIP OF COMMANDThe last problem of strategy in guerrilla war against Japan concerns therelationship of command. A correct solution of this problem is one of theprerequisites for the unhampered development of guerrilla warfare.Since guerrilla units are a lower level of armed organization characterizedby dispersed operations, the methods of command in guerrilla warfare do notallow as high a degree of centralization as in regular warfare. If any attemptis made to apply the methods of command in regular warfare to guerrilla warfare,its great flexibility will inevitably be restricted and its vitality sapped.A highly centralized command is in direct contradiction to the great flexibilityof guerrilla warfare and must not and cannot be applied to it.However, guerrilla warfare cannot be successfully developed without somecentralized command. When extensive regular warfare and extensive guerrillawarfare are going on at the same time, their operations must be properlyco-ordinated; hence the need for a command co-ordinating the two,i.e., for a unified strategic command by the national general staffand the war-zone commanders. In a guerrilla zone or guerrilla base area withmany guerrilla units, there are usually one or more guerrilla formations(sometimes together with regular formations) which constitute the main force,a number of other guerrilla units, big and small, which represent thesupplementary force, and many armed units composed of people not withdrawnfrom production; the enemy forces there usually form a unified complex toconcert their operations against the guerrillas. Consequently, the problemarises of setting up a unified or centralized command in such guerrilla zonesor base areas.Hence, as opposed both to absolute centralization and to absolutedecentralization, the principle of command in guerrilla war should be centralizedstrategic command and decentralized command in campaigns and battles.Centralized strategic command includes the planning and direction of guerrillawarfare as a whole by the state, the co-ordination of guerrilla warfare withregular warfare in each war zone, and the unified direction of all theanti-Japanese armed forces in each guerrilla zone or base area. Here lackof harmony, unity and centralization is harmful, and every effort must bemade to ensure all three. In general matters, that is, matters of strategy,the lower levels should report to the i higher and follow their instructionsso as to ensure concerted action. Centralization, however, stops at thispoint, and it would likewise be harmful to go beyond it and interfere withthe lower levels in matters of detail like the specific dispositions fora campaign or battle. For such details must be settled in the light of specificconditions, which change from time to time and from place to place and arequite beyond the knowledge of the distant higher levels of command. Thisis what is meant by the principle of decentralized command in campaigns andbattles. The same principle generally applies in regular operations, especiallywhen communications are inadequate. In a word, it means guerrilla warfarewaged independently and with the initiative in our hands within the frameworkof a unified strategy.Where a guerrilla base area constitutes a military area divided into sub-areas,each comprising several counties, each of which is again divided into districts,the relationship between the various levels, from the headquarters of themilitary area and sub-areas down to the county and district governments,is one of consecutive subordination, and every armed force must, accordingto its nature, be under the direct command of one of these. On the principlethat has been enunciated, in the relationship of command at these levelsmatters of general policy should be centralized in the higher levels, whileactual operations should be carried out in the light of the specificcircumstances by the lower levels, which should have the right of independentaction. If a higher level has something to say about the actual operationsundertaken at a lower level, it can and should advance its views as"instructions" but must not issue hard and fast "commands". The more extensivethe area, the more complex the situation and the greater the distance betweenthe higher and the lower levels, the more advisable it becomes to allow greaterindependence to the lower levels in their actual operations and thus givethose operations a character conforming more closely to the local requirements,so that the lower levels and the local personnel may develop the abilityto work independently, cope with complicated situations, and successfullyexpand guerrilla warfare. For an armed unit or bigger formation which isengaged in a concentrated operation, the principle to be applied is one ofcentralization in its internal relationship of command, since the situationis clear to the higher command; but the moment this unit or formation breaksup for dispersed action, the principle of centralization in general mattersand of decentralization in details should be applied, for then the specificsituation cannot be clear to the higher command.Absence of centralization where it is needed means negligence by the higherlevels or usurpation of authority by the lower levels, neither of which canbe tolerated in the relationship between higher and lower levels, especiallyin the military sphere. If decentralization is not effected where it shouldbe, that means monopolization of power by the higher levels and lack ofinitiative on the part of the lower levels, neither of which can be toleratedin the relationship between higher and lower levels, especially in the commandof guerrilla warfare. The above principles constitute the only correct policyfor solving the problem of the relationship of command. NOTES1. The Changpai mountain range is situated on the northeasternborder of China. After the Japanese invasion on September 18, 1931, the regionbecame a base area for the anti-Japanese guerrillas led by the Chinese CommunistParty.2. The Wutai mountain range is situated on the bordersbetween Shansi, Hopei and what was then Chahar Province. In October 1937the Eighth Route Army led by the Chinese Communist Party started buildingthe Shansi-Chahar-Hopei anti-Japanese base area with the Wutai mountain regionas its centre.3. The Taihang mountain range is situated on the bordersbetween Shansi, Hopei and Honan Provinces. In November 1937 the Eighth RouteArmy started building the southeastern Shansi anti-Japanese base area withthe Taihang mountain region as its centre.4. The Taishan Mountain is one of the chief peaks of theTai-Yi mountain range in central Shantung. In the winter of 1937 the guerrillaforces led by the Communist Party started building the central Shantunganti-Japanese base area with the Tai-Yi mountain region as its centre.5. The Yenshan mountain range is situated on the borderof Hopei and what was then Jehol Province. In the summer of 1938 the EighthRoute Army started building the eastern Hopei anti-Japanese base area withthe Yenshan mountain region as its centre.6. The Maoshan Mountains are in southern Kiangsu. In June1938 the New Fourth Army led by the Communist Party started building thesouthern Kiangsu anti-Japanese base area with the Maoshan mountain regionas its centre.7. Experience gained in the War of Resistance proved thatit was possible to establish long-term and, in many places, stable base areasin the plains. This was due to their vastness and big populations, thecorrectness of the Communist Party's policies, the extensive mobilizationof the people and the enemy's shortage of troops. Comrade Mao Tse-tung affirmedthis possibility more definitely in later directives.8. Ever since the end of World War II, the national anddemocratic revolutionary movement has been surging forward in Asia, Africaand Latin America. In many countries the people, led by their own revolutionaryand progressive forces, have carried on sustained armed struggles to overthrowthe dark rule of imperialism and reaction. This demonstrates that in thenew historical circumstances--when the socialist camp, the revolutionaryforces of the people in the colonial countries and the forces of the peoplestriving for democracy and progress in all countries are taking giant stridesforward, when the world capitalist system is weakening still further, andwhen the colonial rule of imperialism is heading for disintegration--theconditions under which the people of various countries conduct guerrillawarfare today need not be quite the same as those which were necessary inthe days of the guerrilla warfare waged by the Chinese people against Japan.In other words, guerrilla war can be victoriously waged in a county whichis not large in territory, as for instance, in Cuba, Algeria, Laos and southernViet Nam.9. Weichi is an old Chinese game, in which thetwo players try to encircle each ocher's pieces on the board. When a player'spieces are encircled, they are counted as "dead" (captured). But if thereis a sufficient number of blank spaces among the encircled pieces, then thelatter are still "alive" (not captured).10. In 353 BC the state of Wei laid siege to Hantan, capitalof the state of Chao. The king of the state of Chi, an ally of Chao, orderedhis generals Tien Chi and Sun Pin to aid Chao with their troops. Knowingthat the crack forces of Wei had entered Chao and left their own territoryweakly garrisoned, General Sun Pin attacked the state of Wei whose troopswithdrew to defend their own country. Taking advantage of their exhaustion,the troops of Chi engaged and routed them at Kueiling (northeast of the presentHorse County in Shantung). The siege of Hanean, capital of Chao, was thuslifted. Since then Chinese strategists have referred to similar tactics as"relieving the state of Chao by besieging the state of Wei". Transcription by the Maoist Documentation Project. HTML revised 2004 by Marxists.org 2b1af7f3a8

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